And what about the next time? The current crisis seemed to sputter out as the Iraqis began to withdraw their elite Republican Guard from within striking distance of Kuwait. But if Saddam Hussein wants to stir the pot again, all he has to do is move his men a few hundred miles. The Americans are thousands of miles away. To meet an Iraqi challenge, they would have to either mount a last-minute airlift and sealift, which might be too late -or garrison a substantial force in the region, which no one, Arab or American, wants them to do. The need to defend Kuwait might abate if Iraq’s dictator were killed or overthrown. “Anyone would be better than Saddam at this point,” says a U.S. official. But with economic sanctions causing severe hardship, he seems to have his long-suffering people thoroughly cowed. “If anything, Saddam has consolidated his power,” says a foreign diplomat in Baghdad.
As the Iraqis started to pull back, the U.S. military deployment went on. By the end of last week, there were more than 21,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen in the region, and more were on the way, building toward a target of around 63,000 (map). They will start to come home “a few weeks after the Iraqis finish their redeployment,” said Secretary of Defense William Perry. If that schedule holds, the total cost of the operation will be between $500 million and $1 billion, Perry said.
If Saddam had been serious about invading Kuwait, the battle could have been bloody for the Americans, and the outcome uncertain. By last Monday, Oct. 10, the lead elements of two Iraqi divisions had moved to within 15 miles of the Kuwaiti border. There were about 40,000 Iraqi troops facing Kuwait, backed by air-defense and artillery batteries and a large supply train. U.S. intelligence intercepted a message ordering Iraqi commanders to “be ready to conduct operations for extended periods of time.” That morning, Perry said on television: “There are 28,000 [U.S.] ground combat troops either in Kuwait or. . . committed to go to Kuwait.” But none of them had arrived yet. By Tuesday morning, the 24th had only 300 men in Kuwait. The Americans also still lacked most of the attack aircraft needed to knock out Iraqi tanks. Yet that same day, Baghdad suddenly announced that its forces would pull back.
The question was how to keep them from moving south again. At first, Washington floated the idea of barring all Iraqi forces - or at least all tanks - from the area south of the 32d parallel, from which Iraqi warplanes already are banned. But the allies wouldn’t go for that; among other things, it would have interfered with Saddams ability to deal with Shiite rebels in the south, opening the region to exploitation by Iran. Instead, Washington pushed for a U.N. resolution requiring the Republican Guards to return to their original positions.
But Saddam’s hands wouldn’t be completely tied; he could still beat his adversaries into the field with an army capable of invading Kuwait. Iraq currently has the better part of two corps south of the 32d parallel, including some 70,000 troops and 800 tanks. Washington cannot afford to garrison Kuwait indefinitely with a force capable of meeting such a threat. For a full, sustained deployment, Perry said last week, “we’re talking about billions of dollars.” The only other option is the rapid deployment of troops, ships and planes when needed, with some equipment and ammunition pre-positioned in the region.
That poses a break-the-bank challenge to Bill Clinton’s budget. Amid post-cold-war cuts in defense spending, the United States now faces potentially simultaneous confrontations in two widely separated theaters, Korea and the Persian Gulf. Its fighting forces may be adequate to deal with both of them at once, but the Pentagon does not have the necessary airlift capability. The problem is aggravated by the navy’s failure over the last 15 years to modernize its carrier-based attack planes. With the retirement of the Vietnam-era A-6, the navy lacks the ability to press home around-the-clock precision strikes against any enemy with a reasonable air-defense system. It has no precision strike aircraft and no “stealth” aircraft, such as the air force F-117A. During the gulf war, the role of naval warplanes other than the A-6 was almost insignificant.
As a result, the Pentagon cannot rely on carriers as floating airfields to be used against well-armed adversaries. The air force has to do the job with land-based planes. That puts more strain on U.S. airlift resources, which also are responsible for getting combat troops to the scene of a crisis. The answer is more money for transport and tanker planes. But spending more money on second-rate bullies like Saddam Hussein is not something Bill Clinton wants to do.
The U.S. paid only 12% of the gulf war costs, but this time around it’s unclear who will help pick up the estimated 8500 million-to-$1 billion tab.
GULF WAR CONTRIBUTIONS IN MILLIONS Saudi Arabia $16,003 Kuwait 16,058 Japan 10,008 United States 7,400* Germany 6,455 United Arab Emirates 4,088 Korea 251 Others 29 Cost of Gulf War $61,100* * ESTIMATES SOURCE: D.O.D.
